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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to extend the Fields’ (1989) multi sector job-search model 
in a three sector general equilibrium framework by introducing international trade and an input, 
capital. The three sectors are the rural sector, the urban informal sector and the urban formal 
sector. The rural sector and the urban informal sector use one type of mobile capital while the 
urban formal sector uses sector-specific another type of capital. We find that the effects of the 
inflow of foreign capital in the urban formal sector on unemployment and social welfare 
crucially hinge on the relative factor intensities of the rural and the urban informal sectors. We 
show that there is a possibility of a trade-off between the government’s twin objectives of 
improvement in social welfare and mitigation of the urban unemployment problem. These results 
are extremely crucial from the view of policymaking in an unemployment plagued, low-income 
developing economy. 
Keywords: Job search, foreign capital, unemployment, ex-post labour, ex-ante labour, general 
equilibrium. 
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JOB-SEARCH AND FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW ----A THREE SECTOR GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Job search is an integral part of the labour market in all economies irrespective of whether 
developing or developed. Originally, the search theory was formulated to analyse unemployment 
and later, it was extended to enlighten many things like unemployment duration, on the job 
search etc.   The idea of job search has been incorporated in the models of  McCall (1970), Fields 
(1975, 1989), Majumder (1975), Stark (1982), Adam and Cletus (1995), Postel-Vinay and Robin 
(2002), Dolado et al. (2009), Hussey (2005), Sheng and Xu (2007), Flinn and Mabli (2008), 
Arseneau and Chugh (2009), Macit (2010) etc. 
 
McCall (1970) used the job search theory as a standard tool for analyzing the decision making 
process of a jobseeker. Fields (1975) considers three  types  of  job search:  job search  from  the  
agricultural sector, Job  search  from  the  urban  informal  sector  and  full-time  job  search.  
Fields (1989)  extends  his  earlier  model  to  distinguish  between  ex-ante  job  search and  ex-
post  employment. Majumder (1975) shows that the ‘graduation theory’1 theory  fails if  the  
urban  formal  sector directly  recruits  from  the  rural  sector.   
 
Stark (1982)  explains  job  search  in  a  two  period planning  horizon  where  search  
technologies  are  not  sector  independent. Adam and Cletus (1995) present a simple model of 
job-search where an unemployed worker receives job offer, but he takes decision on whether to 
accept this offer based on a set of criteria. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) explain wage increase 
in terms of job search and bargaining theory. Dolado et al. (2003) consider a matching model 
with heterogeneous jobs and workers which allows for on-the-job search by mismatched 
workers. Hussey (2005) develops a general equilibrium business cycle model with on-the-job 
search and wage rigidity arising from long term labour contract.  
                                                 
1
 According to the ‘graduation theory’ it is beneficial to remain in the urban informal sector and search 
part time for a highly paid job in the urban formal sector. 
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Sheng and Xu (2007) develop a simple two sector search model to examine the impact of the 
terms of trade (TOT) shocks on unemployment and they show that an improvement of TOT 
reduces unemployment. Flinn and Mabli (2008) analyse the impact of binding minimum wage on 
labour market outcomes and welfare in a partial equilibrium model of matching and bargaining 
in the presence of on-the-job search. Arseneau and Chugh (2009) introduce general equilibrium 
efficiency in the standard labour search and matching framework. Macit (2010) develops a New 
Keynesian model in search and matching structure with firing costs and shows how labour 
market institutions affect the wage and inflation dynamics. 
 
It is worth noting that the theoretical literature on search unemployment has not been adequately 
dealt with liberalized economic policies and their consequences on the developing economies. A 
notable exception is Bandopadhyay and Chaudhuri (2011) that has examined the effects of 
foreign capital inflows on unemployment and welfare in a developing economy by extending the 
search unemployment model of Fields (1989) to include international trade and capital as a 
separate input of production. But this is a two sector general equilibrium model that includes a 
rural sector and an urban formal sector only. However, it is beyond any doubt that the informal 
sector plays a very significant role in employment in developing countries constituting at least 70 
per cent of total employment of the working population (Agenor 1996) and that in most cases the 
informal sector mainly produces non-traded intermediate goods for the formal sector on a sub-
contract basis.2 The ongoing process of economic reforms has increased significantly the role 
played by the informal sector in determining the pattern of employment in the developing 
countries. Reformatory policies contract the formal manufacturing sector and drive workers out 
to the informal segment of the labour market. Empirical studies e.g. Bhalotra (2002), Dev 
(2000), ILO (2006) and Leite (2006) have reported that the size of the informal sector in the 
developing countries has increased considerably in the post-reform period. But the expanding 
informal sector has not been able to absorb the huge number of retrenched workers from the 
formal sector. The consequence has been a steep rise in the level of open unemployment in many 
of the developing economies.  
 
                                                 
2
 See Papola (1981), Romatet (1983) and Bose (1978) among others. 
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Keeping in view the importance of the urban informal sector the present paper develops a three-
sector general equilibrium model in the line of Fields’ (1989) analysis of search unemployment 
where the urban informal sector produces a non-traded input for the urban formal sector. In the 
line of Fields (1989) we distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post allocation of the labour force. 
However, unlike Fields (1989), we assume a flexible and market determined rural sector wage. 
The rural sector (sector 1) and the urban informal sector (sector 2) use capital of type 1 while the 
urban formal sector (sector 3) uses capital of type 2. So, capital of type 1 is perfectly mobile 
between the first two sectors while capital of type 2 is specific to sector 3. We also assume two 
concepts of factor intensity: ex-ante factor intensity and ex-post factor intensity. We examine the 
impact of an inflow of foreign capital on unemployment and social welfare. Our analysis finds 
that inflows of foreign capital may lower the urban unemployment level but worsens social 
welfare when the urban informal sector is more capital-intensive relative to the rural sector. 
Quite interestingly in the case when the rural sector is capital-intensive we may obtain exactly 
the opposite results on urban unemployment and national welfare. Our analysis, therefore, 
suggests the possibility of a trade-off between the government’s twin objectives of growth with 
foreign capital and mitigation of the urban unemployment problem. These results are extremely 
important from the view of policymaking in an unemployment plagued, low-income developing 
economy.  
 
2.  The model  
The paper builds up a three-sector job-search model for a small open economy. The three sectors 
are the rural sector (Sector1), the urban informal sector (Sector 2) and the urban formal sector 
(Sector3). 1X  is the export good which is produced in Sector 1. 2X  is the non-traded good which 
is produced in Sector 2 and is used as input in Sector3. Both sector 1 and sector 2 uses labour 
and capital of type 1 as their inputs. Finally, sector 3 produces the import good, 3X  by means of 
labour, capital 2 and the non-traded input produced by sector 2. The assumption of small open 
economy gives constant product prices for the two internationally traded goods, whereas the 
price of the non-traded good is determined in the domestic market.  
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We make a simplifying assumption that capital of type 2 is entirely owned by foreign capitalists 
although this can be enormously relaxed to include both domestic and foreign capital if these two 
types of capital are perfect substitutes.3 The production function of all the sectors are subject to 
the Law of constant return to scale and diminishing marginal productivity to each input. All the 
markets except the urban formal labour market are competitive and in the long run equilibrium, 
product price is matched exactly by the unit cost of production in each sector. So according to 
our assumption, foreign capital is specific to the formal sector. However, capital of type 1 is 
perfectly mobile between the rural sector and the urban informal sector. So, we have different 
rentals on the two types of capital in the economy. As both sector 1 and sector 2 use the same 
two inputs they together form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem (HOSS) and can therefore be 
classified in terms of factor intensities in value sense.4 However, at this stage we do not want to 
make any specific factor intensity classification. We would rather consider both the cases one by 
one and see how our results change depending on different factor intensity conditions.  
The urban formal sector’s wage rate is institutionally given.5 Urban unemployment exists in our 
stylized economy as urban job seekers devote full time for searching urban jobs and all of them 
do not get high paid urban jobs. The unsuccessful urban job seekers stay in the urban sector 
being unemployed. 
 
The following notations are used in the model: 
Xi =level of output produced in the i th where 1,2,3i = : a ji  = amount of the jth input required 
to produce one unit of the ith commodity; kL = ex-ante amount of labour in the k -th job-search 
strategy, k =1, 2 3 ; Li =ex-post level of employment in i -th sector; 1P  =1(commodity 1 is the 
                                                 
3
 See Papola (1981), Romatet (1983), Chaudhuri et al. (2006) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) 
among other. 
 
4
 This is due to the fact that the wage rates in the rural sector and the urban informal sector differ.  
 
5
 The workers in the urban formal sector are unionized and are able to wrest a higher unionized wage 
which may be determined as a Nash bargaining game between the representative labour union and the 
representative firm. See in this context, Chaudhuri (2003) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009). 
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numeraire); 2P = price of commodity 2;  3
* (1 )3P t P= + = tariff-inclusive domestic price of commodity 
3; t  = ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of commodity 3; 1W  = rural wage rate; 2W  = urban 
informal sector wage rate; *3W = the exogenously given wage in the unionized sector 3;  R1 = 
rate of return on capital of type 1; 2R = return on capital of type 2; ρ  = probability of getting 
urban jobs; 1ϕ = job search efficiency in the rural sector; 2ϕ = job search efficiency in the urban 
informal sector; L =total labour endowment in the economy; 1K = stock of capital of type 1 in the 
economy; 2K = amount of foreign capital in the economy;U  = level of urban unemployment; 
Di =  domestic demand for the goods produced in the i th sector 1, for 1,3i = ; M = volume of 
import of good 3; Y = national income at domestic prices; ^ = proportional change; jiθ = 
distributive share of the j th factor in i th sector with , , 2j L K= ; and, 1,2,3i = ; jiλ = allocative 
share of the j th factor in i th sector; iσ = elasticity of factor substitution in the i th sector.   
 
The general equilibrium structure of the model is as follows: 
The competitive profit conditions are given by the following three price- unit cost equalities. 
11111 =+ KaRLaW                        (1) 
2 2 1 2 2W a R a PL K+ =                                                                                                                          (2) 
* *(1 )3 2 2 2 2 23 3 3W a R a P a t P PL K+ + = + =          (3) 
                                                                                                                                     
The probability of getting urban formal sector job is 
1 2 3
3 3 1 2a X L L LLρ ϕ ϕ = / (  + +  )                 (4) 
where 1 2 31 2L L Lϕ ϕ(  + +  )  is the total number of job seekers. 
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Each search strategy has expected income. In equilibrium, the expected income from the three 
strategies would be equal. Thus, the allocation of labour force among the three strategies is given 
by 
( )* * *(1 ) = 1   3 1 3 1 1 2 3 2 2W W W W Wρ ϕ ρ ϕ ρ ϕ ρ ϕ ρ= + − + −             (5, 6)6 
The number of people searching urban formal sector jobs from the rural sector is 1L .Out of 1L , 
1
1 Lϕ ρ people get employment in the urban formal sector. Thus, the ex-post number of workers in 
the rural sector is  
1(1 )   1 1 1a X LL ϕ ρ= −                    (7)                         
 
The ex-post number of workers in the urban informal sector (non-traded sector) is 
2(1 )   2 2 2a X LL ϕ ρ= −
                                                     (8) 
 
The fixed amount of total labour force in the economy is not fully employed.The ex-ante and the 
ex-post endowments of labour are given by the following equations 
1 2 3
   L L L L+ + =                                 (9)    
                                                                                  
1 1 2 2 3 3a X a X a X U LL L L+ + + =                (10)                          
 
The endowments of capital are fixed and fully employed. The full employment of domestic as 
well as foreign capital is given by 
3 3 2a X KK =                                                                                                                     (11) 
1 1 2 2 1a X a X KK K+ =                                                                                                                 (12) 
 
                                                 
6
 Following Fields (1975, 1989)it is assumed that rural job-seekers are less efficient than those in  the 
informal sector. This means, 1 2ϕ ϕ< . 
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The output of the informal sector, 2X , is used entirely in sector 3 as input. The supply of 2X is 
circumscribed by its total demand by sector 3. The demand-supply equality condition is given by 
 
2 23 3X a X=                                                                                                                                (13) 
The per-unit requirement of the intermediate input is assumed to be technologically fixed in 
sector 3.7 This implies that to produce one unit of formal sector’s product 23a units of the non-
traded input are required. 
 
The country exports commodity 1 and imports commodity 3. The trade balance condition 
requires that  
( )1 1 3 3 3 2X D P D X R KF− = − +
        
or,   
* *
1 3 3 1 3 3 3 2 2D P D X P X tP M R K+ = + + −
                                           (14)  
 
where ( )13 3P t P∗ = + is the tariff- inclusive domestic price of commodity 3 and ( )3 3M D X= −  
is the volume of import of good 3; and, 2 FR K is the repatriated income of foreign capital. .
 
                                                 
The welfare of this small open economy is given by national income at domestic prices,Y . As 
foreign capital income is completely repatriated the expression for national income at domestic 
prices is given by 
                                                 
7
 It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded intermediate good and other factors of 
production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally unrealistic. In industries 
like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their production to the small informal 
sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the production is done in the informal sector firms 
while labeling, packaging and marketing are done by the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced 
in the informal sector does not change in quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final 
commodity. Thus there remains a fixed proportion between the use of the intermediary and the quantity of 
the final commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. It may be noted that several works like 
Gupta (1994), Chaudhuri (2003), Chaudhuri et al. (2006), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) have 
used this assumption for different purposes.   
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*
1 3 3 3 2 2Y X P X tP M R K= + + −         (15)                                                              
It may be noted that 3tP M is the amount of tariff revenue of the government from the import of 
commodity 3 which is completely transferred to the consumers as lump-sum payments. 
 
The aggregate demand for commodity 3 is written as follows. 
*( , )3 3 3
                (-)(+)
D D P Y=
          (16) 
Finally, the volume of import of commodity 3 is given by 
*
3 3 3( , )M D P Y X= −
          (17) 
We can determine , , ,1 2 1W W R ρ  from Equations (1), (2), (5) and (6) in terms of 2P , 
given *, ,3 1 2W ϕ ϕ . Equation (3) determines 2R  in terms of ,given *,  and .2 3 3P W P t  Thus, we 
get , ,1 2 3a a aK K K  in terms of 2P . Then, Equation (11) yields 3X  in terms of 2P , given KF . 
Now, using Equations (7), (8) and (9) into (4) we get, 
 
 
* *
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3W a X W a X W L W a XL L Lρ+ = −
                                                                           (4.1) 
 
Solving Equations (4.1) and (12) we get, ,1 2X X  as functions of 2P , given , 3K WF
∗
. Then; we 
get 2P from Equation (13). 
1L is obtained from Equation (7) and 2L  from Equation (8) and 
3L from Equation (9).
 
U  is obtained from Equation (10), given L .ThenY is obtained from 
Equation (15)  Finally, 3D  is obtained from Equation (16). 
  
3.  Comparative statics: 
 
We are now going to examine the effects of foreign capital inflow on urban unemployment and 
national welfare in our small open economy.  
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Totally differentiating Equations (1), (2),(3), ( 4.1), (5), (6), (10),(12), (13) and using the  static 
stability condition in a market for commodity 2 and  simplifying we can prove8 the following 
proposition: 
: 
Proposition 1: In the case when the urban informal sector is more capital-intensive relative to 
the rural sector an inflow of foreign capital lowers urban unemployment if (i) 
*31 2( ) ( )
1
WL L
W
λ λ
ρ
+
≥ ; (ii) 2 3 2( ) ( )
1 1
L L K
L K
λ λ λ
λ λ
+
≥ ; and, (iii) 03σ ≅ . However, when the rural 
sector is capital-intensive the urban unemployment problem is likely to aggravate under 
reasonable conditions.  
 
 
We may explain Proposition 1 as follows. An inflow of foreign capital in the formal sector 
(sector 3) affects both the factor prices and the output composition of the economy. As capital of 
type 2 is specific to sector 3, it expands and demands more labour and the non-traded input 
produced by sector 2 (the informal sector). Consequently, sector 2 also expands and sector 1 has 
to contract as it has to release capital of type 1 to the expanding sector 2. As the price of non-
traded input, 2P , rises and sector 2 is intensive in the use of capital of type 1, the return to this 
type of capital, 1R rises and the wage rates in these two sectors, 1W and 2W decrease (it becomes 
clear if one looks into the two zero-profit conditions of sector 1 and sector 2, i.e., .equations 1 
and 2). The producers in the first two sectors substitute capital of type 1 by labour as the relative 
prices of labour in both sectors have decreased. This raises 1aL and 2aL and lowers 
1aK and 2aK . As sector 2 has expanded the employment level in that sector expands. However, 
the effect on employment level in sector 1 is ambiguous as 1aL rises but 1X falls. On the other 
hand, the employment level in sector 2 i.e. 3 3a XL rises as the degree of substitutability between 
labour and capital of type 2 in that sector ( 3σ ) is very low and that sector 3 has expanded, the 
employment level in sector 3 rises. The net effect of all these three effects would be an increase 
in the aggregate employment in the three sectors of the economy under the sufficient conditions 
                                                 
8
. Interested readers may check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request.. 
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as provided in proposition 1. Consequently, the urban unemployment level in the economy, 
decreases. On the contrary, when sector 2 is more labour-intensive relative to sector 1 with 
respect to capital of type 1, 1R falls and the two wage rates, 1W and 2W increase. Producers in the 
two sectors now substitute labour by capital leading to decrease in both 1aL and 2aL . 
Employment in sector 1 unambiguously decreases while that in sector 2 may decrease subject to 
a few sufficient conditions. The level of employment in sector 3, of course, increases 
unambiguously as 3σ is significantly low. The net outcome of all these effects would be a 
decrease in aggregate employment and hence an increase in the urban unemployment level under 
the sufficient conditions as stated in the proposition. 
   
 
For examining the welfare consequence of inflows of foreign capital after totally differentiating 
Equation (15), using Equations (4.1), (5), (13) and (16) and simplifying we can prove9 the 
following proposition.  
 
Proposition2: An inflow of foreign capital unambiguously lowers social welfare if the informal 
sector is capital-intensive vis-à-vis the rural sector. However, in the opposite case, social welfare 
may improve under reasonable conditions.  
 
 
Proposition 2 can be intuitively discussed in the following fashion. An inflow of foreign capital 
in the presence of a tariff and with full repatriation of income on foreign capital affects national 
income in two ways. First, there occurs a reallocation of labour in the different sectors of the 
economy, offering different wages, following a change in the output composition. This we call 
the labour reallocation effect which may have positive or negative effect on national income in 
the two different situations. Second, as the tariff-protected import-competing sector expands, the 
volume of import falls. This lowers the tariff revenue which is transferred to the consumers in a 
lump-sum fashion. This may be called the tariff revenue effect which unambiguously produces 
unfavourable effect on social welfare. In the situation where the urban informal sector is more 
capital-intensive vis-à-vis the rural sector 1 contracts while the other two sectors expand. The 
                                                 
9
. Interested readers may check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request.. 
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aggregate wage income changes as the three sectors offer three different wages, 
with *3 1 2W W W> > . Our analysis shows that the change in aggregate wage income is 
unambiguously negative.10  This is the negative labour reallocation effect which also exerts a 
downward pressure on national welfare. Therefore, social welfare measured in terms of national 
income at domestic prices worsens unequivocally. On the contrary, in the case where the rural 
sector is capital-intensive, the labour reallocation effect is positive11. So there are two opposite 
effects on welfare. In the absence of any tariff i.e. 0t = , there does not exist any negative tariff 
revenue effect and welfare definitely improves owing to the positive labour reallocation effect. 
Despite the presence of a tariff, social welfare may still improve if the positive labour 
reallocation effect dominates over the negative tariff revenue effect.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The paper aims to contribute to the literature on rural-urban migration and labour force allocation 
across sectors, in analyzing the dynamics of unemployment and social welfare. The present 
paper extends the Fields’ (1989) model by introducing capital and international trade into the 
Fields’ (1989) framework and examines the effects of inflow of foreign capital on 
unemployment and social welfare. In this model the urban informal sector produces a non-traded 
input for the urban formal sector where the workers receive the highest wage. Our analysis 
shows that the results of an inflow of foreign capital on urban unemployment and social welfare 
hinge crucially on the factor intensity rankings of the rural and urban informal sector. If urban 
informal sector is capital intensive relative to the rural sector, an inflow of foreign capital may 
reduce unemployment but unambiguously lower social welfare. On the contrary, when the rural 
sector is more capital intensive than the informal sector we may obtain exactly the opposite 
results. Foreign capital inflow may raise urban unemployment but improve social welfare. Thus, 
in both the cases it is obvious that there is a trade-off between reduction of unemployment and 
achieving growth with foreign capital which deserves the attention of the policy makers to design 
proper development policy for a small open economy.   
                                                 
10
 Interested readers may check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
 
11
 Interested readers may check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
  
13 
References 
 
Agenor, P.R. (1996): “The Labour Market and Economic Adjustment”, IMF Staff Papers, 32, 
261-355. 
 
Adam M.Z. and Cletus C. C (1995):  “An Introduction to the Theory and Estimation of a Job-
search Model”, Review, January/February, 53- 65. 
 
Bandopadhyay, T.K. and Chaudhuri, S. (2011):  “Job-search and Foreign Capital Inflow ----A 
Two Sector General Equilibrium Analysis”, Economic Modeling, 28, 2494–2501. 
 
Bhalotra, S. (2002): “The Impact of Economic Liberalisation on Employment and Wages in 
India”, ILO, Geneva. 
 
Bose, A.N. (1978): “Calcutta and Rural Bengal: Small Sector Symbiosis”, Minerva Publications, 
New Delhi. 
 
Chaudhuri, S. (2003): “How and How far to Liberalize a Developing Country with Informal 
Sector and Factor Market Distortions”, Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development, 12(4), 403-428. 
 
Chaudhuri, S., Yabuuchi, S. and Mukhopadhyay, U.(2006): “Inflow of Foreign Capital and 
Trade Liberalisation in a Model  with an Informal Sector and Urban Unemployment”, Pacific 
Economic Review, 11(1), 87-103. 
 
Chaudhuri, S. and Mukhopadhyay, U. (2009): “Revisiting the Informal Sector: A General 
Equilibrium Approach”, Springer. New York. 
 
Christopher Flinn, James Mabli (2008): “On-the-job search, Minimum Wages and Labor Market 
Outcomes in an Equilibrium Bargaining Framework”, Working paper no.91, 
www.carloalberto.org. 
  
14 
 
David M. Arseneau, Sanjay K. Chugh (2009), “Labor Force Participation and  General 
Equilibrium Efficiency in Search and Matching Models”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 55, 
1401-1414. 
 
Dev. M. (2000): “Economic Liberalisation and Employment in South Asia”, Economic and 
Political Weekly, January, 40-51. 
 
Fields, G., (1975), “Rural-urban Migration, Urban Unemployment and Underemployment and 
Job Search Activity in LDCs”, Journal of Development Economics, 2, No.2, 165-187. 
 
Fields, G. , (1989), “On-the–job search in a Labour Market Model, Ex-ante Choices and Ex-post 
Outcomes”, Journal of Development Economics, 30, 159-178. 
 
Gupta, M.R. (1994): “Duty- free Zone, Unemployment and Welfare: A Note”, Journal of 
Economics, 59(2), 217-236. 
 
Harris, J. R. and M. P. Todaro, (1970), “Migration, Unemployment and Development: a Two-
Sector Analysis”, American Economic Review, 60, 126-142. 
 
International Labour Organisation (2006): “ Global Employment Trends Brief”, ILO, Geneva. 
 
JuanJ. Dolado & Marcel Jansen & JuanF. Jimeno, 2009. "On-the-Job Search in a Matching 
Model with Heterogeneous Jobs and Workers," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 
119(534), pages 200-228. 
 
Leite, P.G., McKinley, T., Osorio, R.G. (2006): “The Post –Apartheid Evolution of Earnings 
Inequality in South Africa, 1995-2004”, Working Paper No. 32, International Poverty Centre, 
UNDP,Brazil 
 
  
15 
Macit, F., (2010): “Labor Market Institutions and Wage and Inflation Dynamics”, Economic 
Analysis and Policy 40 (3), 393–410. 
 
Majumder, D., (1975), “The Urban Informal Sector”, IBRD Staff Working Paper, 211, 
Washington. 
 
McCall, J. J. (1970): “Economics of Information and Job Search,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 84, 113–126. 
 
Papola, T. S. (1981): “Urban Informal Sector in a Developing Economy”, New Delhi, Vikash 
Publishing House. 
 
Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Jean-Mare Robin (2002), “The Distribution of Earnings in an 
Equilibrium Search Model with State–dependent Offers and Counteroffers”, International 
Economic Review, 43(4), 989-1016. 
 
Robert M. Hussey, (2005), "On-the-job Search and Wage Rigidity in a General Equilibrium 
Model," Computing in Economics and Finance , 393, Society for Computational Economics. 
 
Romatet, E. (1983): “Calcutta’s Informal Sector: Theory and Reality”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 18(50), 2115-2128. 
 
Stark, O., (1982), “On modeling the informal sector”, World Development, Vol. 10, No. 5, 413-
416. 
 
Yu Sheng and Xinpeng Xu (2007),” Terms of Trade Shocks and Endogenous Search 
Unemployment: a Two Sector Model of Non Traded Goods”, DEGIT Conference Papers with 
number c012_025. 
 
 
  
  
16 
 
